# Baseline Study of the State of Play of SSG-R and the inclusion of CSOs in SSR processes in Nigeria

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# I. Introduction

The focus of this study is to provide information on the current State of Security Sector Governance (SSG) and the Inclusion of Civil Society in Security Sector Reform (SSR) Processes in Nigeria.

The Objective is to contribute to actions and institutions that are more accountable, responsive and equitable to the security needs of the population and the protection of the State and democratically designated institutions.

## 1.1. The Research Problem

The focus of this study is to provide information on the current State of Security Sector Governance (SSG) and the Inclusion of Civil Society in Security Sector Reform (SSR) Processes in Nigeria. The Objective is to contribute to actions and institutions that are more accountable, responsive and equitable to the security needs of the population and the protection of the State and democratically designated institutions. The content of the research includes an overview of security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) processes in Nigeria and the ECOWAS region; identification of the gaps and causes of the low involvement of civil society in public oversight of the security sector and ways to encourage greater participation of civil society organizations in these reform processes in the region as well as strengthen the national discussions on SSG/R; and provide information that can serve as one of references for the SSG/R barometer which will be used to monitor progress on identified gaps at regional and national levels.

## 1.2. Quality of security provision Versus Quality security sector governance

It is important to clarify the distinction between the quality of security provision and the quality of security sector governance in Nigeria.

The quality of security provision and the quality security sector governance both reinforces each other and overlaps. In Nigeria, the quality of security provision can be said to be arguably average at best and abysmal at worst case. For example, the number of security personnel in comparison to the population and emerging security challenges is low.

Apart from shortage of manpower, there is also issue of lack of operational equipment, arms and ammunition and general logistic limitations that may limit effective and early response to security challenges. On the other hand, the quality of security sector governance in Nigeria is even worse.

However, in some areas there has been some progress especially in relation to level of awareness of the challenges and legal and policy reforms. Advocacy on the need to improve the quality of service delivery within the security sector, welfare and capacity building of security personnel, application of relevant laws/policies and rules of engagement that will eventually lead to improved quality of security provision.

## 1.3. Research methodology

The methodology adopted include interviews, individual and group comments from security agencies, desk review and media tracking. The media tracking on the Security Sector Reforms / Governance (SSRG) status in Nigeria were used

to examine the nature, trend and magnitude of security threats in the country, indicating regional peculiarities. It also x-rayed the nature and challenges in inter-agency cooperation, collaboration and coordination amongst security agencies in Nigeria; the nature and challenges in relation to civil - military relations in Nigeria; nature/evidence of the role of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in policy formulation and oversight on SSR/G in Nigeria; and also the nature of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU) activities on SSR /G and related issues. The tracking and analysis were compiled by based on reports from over 22 influential media platforms including online, print, television and radio stations. The analysis considered 150 stories on SSRG in Nigeria segmented into five parts including: 67 stories that helped to shape the nature and level of security threats in the country, 50 stories that examined the nature and scope of the CSOs engagement in SSRG, 13 stories that highlighted the roles of ECOWAS and AU in promoting the SSRG, and 20 stories that touched on the challenges of inter-agency and civil-military relations in Nigeria as well as similar works by other groups. Key findings revealed that most security threats incidents received significant positive and fair response from relevant agencies with Police (32.16%) and Army (16.67%) as the dominant actors, while bandits, criminals, terrorists/insurgents, and 'unknown gunmen' as major culprits. Also, a careful region-by-region analysis provides a stark perspective to the extent of variations of the security threats. More importantly, the 150-item analysis highlighted some interesting snapshots on the media reports. The report used five different approaches to drive home the relevant issues, actors, factors and mechanisms enhancing or limiting the SSRG in Nigeria:

• The first approach was to gauge the current SSRG atmosphere in Nigeria by analyzing 67 reports within first three weeks of August as captured in several media platforms.

This also includes some periodic reports by some dedicated agencies on the security and governance situation in the country as well as trending security threats and regional variations.

• The second segment as contained in Appendix II containing 50 reports, examined the efforts of the relevant CSOs that are focused in SSRG within the first eight months of 2019, reflecting various actors, actions and mechanisms used. Also included as sub-heads, were relevant activities of key CSOs.

• In the same vein, Appendix III with 13 reports gave a snapshot of what African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) are doing towards SSRG.

• The fourth segment containing 20 stories was the analysis on the nature of the inter-agency and Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria;

• and the last segment was a summary of similar media Tracking works that reflected the prevailing security situation in the country.

The analysis was segmented into four parts: Security trends consisting of 67 stories (August1-23, 2019), CSOs engagements in SSRG consisting of 50 stories (January-August, 2019), ECOWAS and AU's efforts on SSRG with 13 story entries (January-August, 2019), and the Inter-Agency/Civil-Military Relations consisting of 20 stories (2004-August 2019). The scope of the review is within the first eight months of 2019 (January-August 23, 2019) as well as some reports of previous years as was indicated in the Inter-Agency Relations. Over 150 reports were sourced from more than 20 media houses including: Online Media: Premium Times, Global Sentinel, The Cable, Sahara Reporters, Daily Post, Daily Nigeria, Legit, Pulse, Eagle Online; Print: Punch, Guardian, Sun, Vanguard, Leadership, Tribune, New Telegraph, THISDAY, Nation, Blueprint, Daily Trust; and Television & Radio: Channels TV, and VOA.

# II. Nigeria's Security Landscape

An understanding of security and justice reforms in Nigeria must be situated within the context of the country's political history, which has seen seriously compromising individual and community safety, security, access to justice, and the security sector governance by civilian oversight mechanism. The over 59 year history of post – independence Nigeria have witnessed about three decades of military and authoritarian rule ; this include eight military regimes which occurred between 1966 to 1999. In between this period, there was the Nigerian-Biafra civil war from 1967 to 1970 and a four-year civilian rule from 1979 to 1983. The long period of military rule featured 'massive human rights violations and near breakdown of security sector governance; a more presidential rather than democratic governance of the security sector, corruption, and truncation of democratic agendas' (DCAF, 2018). In addition the involvement of the military in politics drastically compromised both the professionalism and operational effectiveness of the Nigerian military, with the Army's officers corps decimated by repeated coups. There has also been military involvement even in the democratic experiments the country has experienced.

In the period immediately following the post military era (1999 to 2007), the government was ruled by an elected ex-military general. Same was the case for 2015 – 2019 and 2019 to date. In addition to the negative effects of a long period of military rule, Nigeria has witnessed several other security challenges which constitute individual and collective threats to peace, security and development of the country requiring genuine efforts security sector reform/governance. Currently, the military is deployed in 32 out of 36 States of the Federation following from series of security challenges confronting the country.

Nigeria right from its independence in 1960, has been regarded as one of the most violent countries in Africa even in peace time having been bedevilled with many security and governance challenges including constitutional crises, election crises, census crises, the civil war, inter-state boundary clashes, coups and counter coups and currently terrorism, insurgency, armed militancy, communal clashes, armed robbery, resource control conflicts, cybercrimes, banditry, kidnapping, herders-farmers clashes, human insecurity (human trafficking, hunger, illiteracy, etc.) There are several ungoverned spaces in the country including Nigeria forests with the Sambisa Forest, urban enclaves and some rural areas. The figure released by the Nigeria Security Tracker on June 1, 2019, indicated that an approximated number of 26,000 Nigerians had been killed as a result of growing insecurity in the first four years of President Muhammadu Buhari (May 29, 2015 - May 29, 2019).

A recent report issued by OpenDoors on Africa: Mapping Islamic militancy – past, present and future - in July 2019 indicated that since 1999 there have been over two thousand attacks by Islamic militants in Nigeria which have caused deaths of thousands of (mostly) Christians in Nigeria and its western neighbours:

- the North West region (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara States) Zamfara State was the worst hit
- In the North Central region (Benue, FCT, Kwara, Niger, Plateau States), banditry and cattle rustling are the predominant threats especially in Nigeria, Plateau and parts of Benue.
- The north central seems relatively peaceful in comparison with other northern regions.
- South West region (Ekiti, Ogun, Lagos, Osun, and Oyo States) experienced the highest

number of kidnapping in June 2019. Unlike the past experience where kidnapping was commonly associated with political undertone and oil related issues, the goal is to attract the maximum ransom possible and victims cut across the social economic spectrum.

• For the South – South region (Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Edo and Delta States), the key security threats were crude kidnapping, pipeline vandalization leading to explosion of some pipelines.

• South East region (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States) recorded the most peaceful region in the country in the month of June 2019 due to the intensity of patrols, roadblocks, raids and other activities of the military line of operation which were circulated widely through the media.

There is general negative atmosphere with regards to the issue of SSRG in Nigeria as exemplified in the media reports reflecting ongoing general state of insecurity, corruption and poor governance.

The report from the media tracking for the month of August 2019 carried out in the course of this research showed a report of several conflicts and violence in various regions across the country.

The National Security Strategy (2019) states that the threats faced by the country are multi-faceted and less predictable with blurred boundaries between external and internal risk factors and lists the following national security threats: terrorism and violent extremism; armed banditry, kidnapping, militancy and separatist agitations; pastoralists and farmers conflicts; transnational organized crime; piracy and sea robbery; porous borders; cybercrimes and technology challenges; socio-political threats; fake news and hate speech; environmental threats; public health challenged; economic challenges (energy deficit, crude oil related crimes, unemployment and poverty, and global economic challenges); and regional and global security challenges.

The roles being played by CSOs as stated earlier in this report include promoting the development of legal and policy framework on SSRG as well as oversight of security agencies and processes. In many regards CSOs also provide roles like those of government especially in failed States and when the government has refused, failed or unable to provide such roles.

## Diagram 1: Key Actors



| | |
|---|---|
| Police | 32% |
| Military | 17% |
| Government (Fed/State) | 12% |
| Gunmen | 10% |
| Terrorists/Insurgents | 8% |
| Bandits | 6% |
| Cultists | 5% |
| UN/ECOWAS | 4% |
| Court | 2% |
| DSS | 2% |
| President Buhari | 2% |

## SECURITY TRENDS

**Table 1:** Geopolitical Spread of Reports on Security Sector Reforms and Governance (SSRG) issues in Nigeria

| Geopolitical Zone | | No of trends | Percentage% |
|---|---|---|---|
| **South West** | | 17 | 25.37 |
| Lagos-10 | (58.82%) | | |
| Ogun-04 | (23.53%) | | |
| Ondo-02 | (11.76%) | | |
| Oyo-01 | (5.88%) | | |
| **Total** | **100%** | | |
| **North East** | | 16 | 23.88 |
| Borno-06 | (37.55) | | |
| Adamawa-03 | (18.75%) | | |
| Taraba-02 | (12.5%) | | |
| Bauchi-02 | (12.5%) | | |
| General-03 | (18.75%) | | |
| **Total** | **100%** | | |
| **North West** | | 10 | 14.93 |
| Katsina-03 | (30%) | | |
| Kaduna-02 | (20%) | | |
| Kano-02 | (20%) | | |
| Zamfara-02 | (20%) | | |
| Sokoto-01 | (10%) | | |
| **Total** | **100%** | | |
| **National/Abuja-FCT** | | 09 | 13.43 |
| **South East** | | 05 | 7.46 |
| Imo-01 | (20%) | | |
| Enugu-01 | (20%) | | |
| Anambra-01 | (20%) | | |
| General- 02 | (40%) | | |
| **Total** | **100%** | | |
| **North Central** | | 05 | 7.46 |
| Benue-02 | (40%) | | |
| Nasarawa-01 | (20%) | | |
| Plateau-01 | (20%) | | |
| Niger-01 | (20%) | | |
| **Total** | **100%** | | |
| **Total** | | **67** | **100%** |

**Key stats/information:**

1. Police, Military, Gunmen, terrorists/insurgents, bandits and government are the dominant actors, villains and heroes in the reported cases of security threats and SSRG in the country within the period under review
2. Unknown Gunmen has become a metaphor for most of unresolved crimes in Nigeria whereby the major actors and perpetrators never unmasked and couched under the tag of 'unknown gunmen'

# III. The Context Analysis

## 3.1. What factors facilitate or hinder CSOs Involvement/Commitment on SSR/G

In Nigeria, there are several factors that facilitate or hinder CSOs involvement/commitment on SSR/G. These include the following:

- **Political.** Party politics and lack of political will from the government to act on certain reforms championed by the CSOs could be a hindrance. For example, several anti-corruption and security reform bills passed by the 8th National Assembly were rejected by President Muhammadu Buhari because of the prevalent Legislative-Executive tension/rivalry that existed between the legislative and executive arms of government at that time.

- **Economic/Financial.** CSOs interventions are limited on SSRG because of limited funding supports on this issue. Lack of adequate funding hamper capacity building, operational capabilities, scope and quality of security provision and security sector governance in the country. Very limited number of development partners fund activities on SSRG in Nigeria. It is important to note that all the NGOs working on the sector and the activities they implement are support by development agencies most of which are supported by international foundations and foreign governments. Nigerian governments, government agencies in Nigerian do not fund such interventions, in fact they expect the NGOs to attract funding and support the government SSRG efforts. Also, very few private sector agencies especially in extractive industry and mainly for the Niger Delta.

- **Social.** The non-domestication of the Child's Rights Act in most states of the north as well as relevant laws like CEDAW empowering women are some of the cases. Another is the *almajiri* practices in the northern region of the country where young children roam around the street seeking alms and support instead of being in school. The level of youth unemployment in the country has been one of the major root causes fueling terrorism, crime and violence in the country.

- **Institutional.** One of the major problems of the SSR/G is Nigeria is the failure to create an inbuilt system and mechanism through which government, civil society could harmonize their inputs towards common goals. According to the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) Security and Governance Impact Report 2017 Nigeria's national conflict management architecture and security governance relies on a complex and overlapping set of agencies that are poorly coordinated, lack strategic direction, are not inclusive or accountable and do not enable cooperation between state and non-state actors. Nigeria's security forces are often accused of human rights abuses including unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, extortion, sexual harassment, and disappearances. This leads to mistrust and negatively affects relations between security forces and the civilian population. To this end, civilian oversight of security institutions is ineffective, and they remain largely unaccountable to civilian line ministries and the general public. There is weak parliamentary and civilian oversight of security agencies.

The key challenge facing the CSOs apart from

the lack of cooperation by the government and security agencies as earlier highlighted is inability for synergy and cooperation. Most CSOs (see list below) seems to be working in silos, hence their individual efforts are not resonating enough to ensure greater changes. Most are not trained enough on how to hold government and security agencies accountable. Some of the government agencies that engage the CSOs do so not out of genuine concern for SSRG but as a means of making money and propaganda posturing to indicate that they are 'working'. Even at that, some of the collaboration are too ad-hoc and reactionary to produce sustainable results. CSOs are often tolerated by most security agencies as 'necessary evil' but not accommodated as equal and important component/stakeholder.

## 3.2. What initiatives have been taken at regional, sub regional, national and sub national levels to address SSRG challenges?

These include the following:

### 3.2.1. ECOWAS and AU's SSRG Focus:

Since the adoption of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in 2008, the emerging regional security environment has necessitated the development of add-ons to the ECOWAS peace and security architecture in order to adopt new approaches and to address previously unanticipated threats. Recent security policies and strategies adopted by ECOWAS include: ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy 2013 and its Implementation Plan; ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy 2014 and its Implementation Plan; ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSRG) 2016 and its Action Plan. The Bamako Declaration on the Security Situation in the Sahel and West Africa adopted by the Ministers in Charge of Foreign

Affairs and Regional Integration in ECOWAS in October 2017; the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability, and the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, adopted by the Joint Summit of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in July 2018; The ECOWAS Sahel Strategy was adopted in 2013 and the 2016-2020 Action Plan. It is important to note that in February 2019, the ECOWAS Commission initiated a process to develop a new Sahel Strategy for ECOWAS (2020-2025).

Furthermore, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government has consistently condemned insecurity, terrorism and violent extremism in the region and in the wider Sahel region. Recent political declarations reinforce this. For instance, the Bamako Declaration on the Security Situation in the Sahel and West Africa, adopted by the Ministers in Charge of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration in ECOWAS in October 2017. In particular, it encouraged establishment of platforms for judicial cooperation among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Member States and with other states, and the creation of specialized judicial centres in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organized crime. Also, the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability, and the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, adopted by the Joint Summit of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in July 2018 endorsed similar measures.

It is important to bear in mind that Member States have the primary responsibility for providing peace and security within their juridical borders. This primary responsibility flows from the sovereignty of states. However, there are instances where external actors may act to support, supplement or complement the efforts of the national level. This is the basis of the twin principle of *subsidiarity* and *complementarity*

which endorse a bottom-up scale of responsibility. However, there may also be situations where the innermost levels of responsibility have the will to act but lack the capacity to do so. In such situations, the Member State may draw on the other levels based on their capacity to do so *(comparative advantage)*.

ECOWAS Policy-Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance (see above details in the general introduction of the case studies) is anchored on: African and West African solidarity and partnership; Respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity; Regional integration; Regional and national ownership; context-specific, gender sensitive and human rights compliant. The SSRG implementation mechanism include the following: ECOWAS Commission (regional level); Member States (national level); and CSOs. But despite this framework, there is a lacuna in implementation as ECOWAS has not been able to perfect and institutionalize its own Security Sector Reform framework despite the fact that it started well ahead of African Union in these reforms. Some of the initiatives included focus on the refugee and IDPs crises, Meeting of ECOWAS Committee of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), ECOWAS Migration Academy and Meeting of ECOWAS Heads of Immigration as well as the Meeting the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO).

The AU Security Sector Framework present a viable framework to guide actions in the region on SSRG. Some of the initiatives by AU include the review and report by the AU reform initiative, the Buhari Unity Band's AU Agenda 2063 Ambassadorial Award in collaboration with AU-ECOSOC commitment to peace and unity in fighting corruption in Nigeria; Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) commitment to tackle terrorism, general insecurity and illicit financial outflows from Africa; and the continental study on 'The Roles and Contributions of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa'.

## 3.2.2. Responsibility and Sensitivity to the needs, perceptions and realities of women, youth and marginalized groups:

The security operations in the region currently is not very responsive and sensitive to the needs, perceptions and realities of women, youth and marginalized groups. Apart from humanitarian relief and efforts to refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) carried out by the government agencies, international organizations, relief and emergency agencies as well as CSOs, there is no targeted programmes specifically designed for these marginalized groups in most West and Central African region. There are very few interventions on these issues. Some of these includes WANEP's Programme on Women in Peace and Security through the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, the International Women Peace Forum work on trying to mobilize women towards participation in peace and security issues, the AU's continental study on 'The Roles and Contributions of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa: West African Regional Consultation', and FES training on ECOWAS for youths from West African countries. In June 2019, ECOWAS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reacting to Early Warning and Response Data (REWARD) collaborated on social inclusion to enhance peace and security in the region. To this end, a workshop was held towards a deeper understanding of the import of social inclusion for the attainment of sustainable peace and security in West Africa. The purpose is to empower the focal points of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in addressing the root causes of violent conflicts including exclusion and identity - based marginalization of groups in the society. The participants were drawn from various Directorates at the ECOWAS Commission, including the Early Warning, Political Affairs, Peacekeeping and Regional Security, Humanitarian, Gender and Social Affairs, Strategic Planning, Communication and External Relations. It is important to note that

**Table 2:** ECOWAS and AU NATURE OF SSRG

| General | ECOWAS | AU |
|---|---|---|
| Security and Governance Sector Reforms | Humanitarian Intervention | Reforms towards Security and Governance in Africa (peace and security, political affairs, economic integration, and global representation) |
| CSOs engagement | Sub-regional security cooperation | Political and social collaboration with CSOs through ECOSOC towards Security and Governance- Peacebuilding |
| Intelligence sharing | AU's PSC Report on security/ tackling violent extremism | Member states intelligence, security and governance institutions under CISSA working Continental security and governance—terrorism and illicit finance |
| Youth participation and development | Border Security | Peace and Security Council sanctioned continental study on 'The Roles and Contributions of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa |
| Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Regional/Continental Peace and stability Humanitarian intervention, Refugees and IDPs | Transnational Crime Joint security operation, coordination and cooperation Protection of Refugees and IDPs Internal security of member states, IDPs | AUC Agenda 2063 of Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 |

**Key stats/information:**
1. About 13 stories were analyzed for both ECOWAS (8) and AU (5) within the first seven months of 2019 on their SSRG efforts, focus, mechanisms and contributions
2. There was some level of CSOs engagement but more prevalent is collaboration with inter-governmental agencies
3. The main anchor ECOWAS and AU's SSRG engagements are: continental/regional reforms, regional stability and development, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency/countering violent extremism, border security/fighting transnational crimes, intelligence sharing, humanitarian crisis/welfare of refugees and IDPs

the vision of ensuring sustainable peace in West Africa through operationalization and mainstreaming of conflict preventions into ECOWAS policies and programmes is embodied in ECOWAS policy document such as the 1993 Revised Treaty, 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

Under President Buhari, control of the security sector remains concentrated around the executive, although a positive step has been taken with regard to anti-corruption, with Nigeria becoming a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in July 2016. The administration has since developed and submitted an OGP National Action Plan for implementation between 2017 and 2019, which aims to enhance and streamline transparency and oversight mechanism. In January 2018, the ministry of Defence also announced that it will review the Armed Forces Act following several criticism from regional civil society organization regarding the lack of effective legislative oversight. There are also issue of overlapping mandates and the need to address these.

The recently launched National Security Strategy by the Nigerian government contains a section on gender sensitivity and security and it states thus:

*'Nigeria recognizes that development is endangered if it is not engendered….It is imperative to engage women as agents of development to ensure social inclusion, sustainable peace and the security of all segments of the society….The reality however is that women are largely excluded from many formal peace processes. In the terrorism affected states, women and children constitute the largest internally displaced persons and refugees across the border. Women are not just victims of war; they are also agents of peace'. (2019:48)*

The Strategy further states that appropriate legislation will be adopted to enhance gender security with a view to promoting inclusiveness across various sectors of the economy and states the following strategic approach:

- Empower women through training, mentoring and other initiatives;
- Promote gender awareness among security personnel towards effective management of gender related issues;
- Integrate gender issues and increase the participation of both sexes, especially women in security – coordinating bodies;
- Build the capacity of women's organisations on security policy issues, including advocacy and oversight;
- Conduct gender – responsive assessments of security needs across federal, state, and local government levels, including the different security needs and resources of men, women, boys and girls;
- Advocate sufficient resources, towards effectively preventing, responding to and addressing gender specific initiatives such as gender – training, especially in response to security concerns in the local communities;
- Influence public policy through advocacy regarding new policies and laws on gender and related issues.
- Build capacity of the media for accurate coverage and reportage on gender and peacebuilding issues;
- Deepen the commitment to gender sensitivity and justice of security policy makers within the executive, legislative, judicial and political parties' platforms through gender training, mentoring, information distribution and lobbying;
- Enhance the capacity of civil society organisations to participate effectively in security policy – making processes;
- Promote equal career opportunities for women and men and to guarantee equal pay for equal work;

- Create equality of access for women and men with regard to political representation and participation; and
- Ensure the protection of women and girls from all forms of aggression and violence.

With respect to youth, the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2019 recognize that the youth constitute over 63 per cent of Nigeria's population and that

> *'Addressing the critical challenges facing them is an urgent priority if social and economic development efforts are to succeed'. (2019: 51)*

The NSS further states that the government policies will focus on overcoming the challenges such as unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and extremist indoctrination that expose the youth to deviant tendencies with associated negative violent outcomes. That the socio-economic weaknesses will be tackled through youth empowerment and other demographic dividends such as targeted investments in agricultural and agro-allied industries and intensification of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP). The objectives stated in the Strategy document are as follows:

- The development and improvement of entrepreneurial skills and competencies with a view to increasing employability of the youth;
- Strengthening of youth participation in decision making process at the local, state and national levels of governance;
- Strengthening family systems, institutional and legal framework for youth development; and
- Promoting national unity through social integration of youth and facilitating socio-economic development.

The NSS states that the overall aim is to rekindle the confidence in young Nigerians in themselves

and in their nation; address the root causes of current security challenges confronting the youth by tackling gaps in opportunity, development and infrastructure; leverage cultural and sports prowess as tools to gainfully engage and reinforce the competitive strengths of the youth; and the need for line ministries, department and agencies to synergize and present a holistic response to the challenges associated with youth development.

### 3.2.4. Obstacles to a consensus on security threats in the West and Central African region

These include the following:

- Competing regional and sub-regional security alliances like G5 Sahel versus MNJTF.
- Interference, influence and loyalty to external powers.
- Colonial heritage and language barriers like in the case of Francophone countries of the MNJTF, Sahel region versus Anglophone Nigeria.
- Lack of resources and financial capacity to fund regional security blocs and alliances.
- Series of conflicts and other competing security challenges in Nigeria and some other key countries in the region.

The role of Nigeria in the ECOWAS both in terms of political leadership and funding cannot be ignored. With Nigeria facing several security challenges across the country, this is a big challenge for the region.

Tackling terrorism and violent extremism require bilateral and multilateral collaboration. In response to the above, the National Security Strategy (2019) states that the country will:

- Continue to support the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) headquartered in N'Djamena – Chad with regional sectors in Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon in its efforts

to counter terrorism and violent extremism and that to give wider coverage to the fight against terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime in the Sahel region,

- Encourage the MNJTF to collaborate with other regional Task Forces, including the Sahel G5 Force established by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger Republic.

- In addition to military measures, fighting terrorism and violent extremism requires soft power approaches including dialogue, mediation, as well as gathering and dissemination of timely and actionable intelligence. The document further states that to improve the operational efficiency of the country's armed forces, there will be sustained support to the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) comprising Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic with strategic support from US, UK and France to procure timely and actionable intelligence against terrorist groups.

- Continue to promote bilateral and multilateral economic, scientific and technical cooperation to boost trade and economic relations with friendly nations towards economic prosperity and will strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral economic relations with regional partners (such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Co-Prosperity Zone COPAZ cooperation among Nigeria/Benin/Togo) and international partners.

- Support the ECOWAS's objectives of regional integration, good governance, peace and stability as well as trade and economic integration among member states, and equally seek to streamline the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of goods and persons across borders of member states while taking measures to curb transnational organized crime.

- Strengthening collaboration with the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Commission member states and other international partners to build capacity of the navies of the region and enhance the capacity of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Security in Yaounde Cameroun, and sustain the Nigerian Navy's Operational readiness in order to improve security within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the GoG.

- Improving the vibrancy of the Community of Sahel-Saharan State (CEN-SAD) to promote internal security through collaboration with member States to fight terrorist groups in the region, counter the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) into Nigeria and address irregular migration and trafficking in persons, especially of women and children.

### 3.2.5. CSOs participation in the SSRG

The CSOs in Nigeria are actively involved in a range of SSR/G activities. For example, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) is involved in a lot of governance and development reform issues; PRAWA is actively engaged in security/justice sector reforms and prisons/corrections issues; CLEEN Foundation has a robust Civil-Military Relations Programme; Search for Common Ground in collaboration with Forum on Farmers and Herders Relations in Nigeria (FFARN) are contributing towards sustainable resolution to farmers and herders conflict; SERAP and CISLAC are involved in a lot of activities on Freedom of Information (FOI), open governance and anticorruption crusade; WANEP engages in women in security and Peacebuilding initiatives; and Amnesty International (AI) Nigeria publications and reports on human Rights violations amongst others. There are many development partners supporting government and CSOs initiatives on SSR/G and related activities. These include Fredrich Ebert Stifung (FES), Konrad Adeneuer

Stifung (KAS), GIZ, European Union (EU), Rule of Law and Anti - Corruption (RoLAC) Programme implemented by the British Council with the funding support of the European Union under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), SWISS EMBASSY, United Kingdom, United States of America, Dutch governments, etc.

Several of these organizations have contributed towards promoting legislative and policy reforms. For example, the Policy and Legislative Advocacy Center (PLAC) undertakes several programmes towards strengthening the capacity of parliamentary committees on SSRG and related issues. The passage of the Police Trust Fund Bill received the support of CSOs such as Partners for West Africa. PRAWA provided technical support towards the drafting and passage of the Nigerian Correctional Service Bill (2019) which was signed into law on the 31st of July 2019. The Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) developed the National Security Strategy (2014) and has released a n updated version of the National Security Strategy in December 2019; and 'Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism; both documents are also contained in 'Strategic Communications' components even though at a rudimentary level (http://ctc.gov.ng/). Others are: Terrorism Amendment Act 2013 (there was a bill to repeal and replace it but this was not able to be passed by the 8th National Assembly. The same was the case with the Police Bill), National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2016. CSOs contributed towards these and towards several other SSRG related laws.

With respect to CSOs role in facilitating oversight on SSRG, so activities have been recorded on this. CISLAC and Transparency International have undertaken several activities in relation to transparency and provision of adequate oversight regarding defense budgets and security votes of state governors, strengthening the oversight capacities of relevant parliamentary committees, etc. The activities undertaken by CISLAC are im-

plemented through the funding support of FES and the Conflict, Security and Stabilization Fund (CSSF) of the British Government. KAS undertakes series of capacity building programmes for parliamentarians, at state level, training on interagency cooperation amongst security agencies, and promotion of cooperation between security agencies and CSOs. KAS implement these activities in partnership with the House of Representatives Committee on Army. CLEEN Foundation undertake activities such as promote accountability of the Nigeria Police Commission and the Nigeria Police Force. PRAWA is implementing the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) Human Rights Training Programme National Roll Out Implementation Plan 2015 - 2020. This consist of the following activities: human rights training for NPF Training Institutions; NPF state based trainings for Divisional Police Officers, Divisional Crime Officers, and NPF Human Rights Desk Officers, and the NPF Human Rights Training and Oversight Resource Team; Human Rights Training for the Special Anti- Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force; Human Rights Training for the NPF Monitoring Units and other monitoring/oversight mechanisms; promote the establishment of human rights training and oversight resource team at the State level; and establishment of the NPF Staff Training and Development National Database, etc. WANEP has undertaken several activities on SSRG especially in the area of peacebuilding and early warning initiatives as well as mainstreaming women in security and peace through the instrumentality of UNSCR 1325. In the implementation of these it has collaborated with ECOWAS and in some instance, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). In response to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), Nigeria developed a National Action Plan (NAP) built on five important pillars – prevention, participation, protection, promotion and prosecution. This was also supported by CSOs. SERAP has to a great extent used the instrumentality of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act to advocate for open and accountable governance in Nigeria and in

collaboration with other CSOs continue championing the anti-corruption crusade in governance. Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) have undertaken several programme activities focusing on the promotion of good governance, electoral reforms, and accountability.

In the course of this research, fifty (50) reports from various media platforms about the CSOs engagements in SSRG in Nigeria were examined. Findings revealed that CSOs are well involved in both the oversight and policy formulation activities towards SSRG in Nigeria. For example, analysis of media reports on the works of West African Network on Peacebuilding (WANEP), Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Prisoners' Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA), Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre/Transparency International Nigeria (CISLAC/TI), Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), and CLEEN Foundation amongst others were carried out. The findings showed that the media reports on CSOs indicated 56% of their activities *on oversight* and 44% on *policy formulations*. (See the Appendices section for some information from the media tracking on some of the CSOs activities on SSRG).

# IV. Analysis of the Interactions Between the Context and the Actors

## 4.1. Analysis of the actors

The roles played by ECOWAS and the AU include the following:

- **Agenda Setting:** The already formulate SSRG Framework that could be directly or indirectly be binding on the member states. They also use this mechanism to collaborate and support the CSOs working in this area.
- **Mediators:** They help to monitor, observe and give recommendations that would go a long way in mediation in the area of SSRG
- **Peer Review:** Through their reports on SSRG they help to provide peer review mechanism and outcome
- **Capacity Building:** Through various workshops they help to build capacity in the area of SSRG.

The roles being played by CSOs include promoting the development of legal and policy framework on SSRG as well as oversight of security agencies and processes. In many regards CSOs also provide roles like those of government especially in failed States and when the government has refused, failed or unable to provide such roles. CSOs role include the following: catalyst/advocate for change; fostering tolerance for diversity and interact among people of different backgrounds / protecting the minority & marginalized member of the society; provision of monitoring and oversight role – holds government accountable; provision of technical support government institutions and agencies; complements & strengthens the capacities, effectiveness, reach and impact of government institutions and services; and delivering of services where government has failed or unable to provide such services.

## 4.2. Analysis of the interactions between the context and the actors

The relationships that exist especially at the national level between security institutions and between security institutions and civil society indicate lack of adequate cooperation, collaboration and coordination. There has also been evidence of instances of open conflicts portraying inter agency rivalry and lack of trust. The extent a given CSO will play all or any of the roles highlighted above under 4.1 and the nature / level of cooperation between it and government agencies will be determined by several factors including the following: the legal framework,  size of the organization, networking, governmental cooperation, the history of the organization, level of education, proximity to the targeted / programme participants, risks of cooperation, media and public communication, etc.

There is general negative atmosphere with regards to the issue of SSRG in Nigeria as exemplified in the media reports reflecting ongoing general state of insecurity, corruption and poor governance. *(see Diagrams 3 to 12 in the Annexes).*

Regarding the nature of government / security agencies responses to reported incidences, the analysis shows those with negative, fair and positive responses by the government as indicated below:

**Negative Responses**
This is scored by noting those reports that attracted
- no action by the government
- poor action by the government
- Dismissive response by the government
- indifference response by the government

The result shows that of the cases of SSRG incidents analyzed 10 (14.9%) were recorded as having negative responses.

**Fair Responses**
This is scored by noting those reports that attracted
- Acknowledgment of the report of the incidence by the government
- A 'promise to respond' response communicated by the government
- Planned action of response communicated/indicated by the government

The result shows that of the cases of SSRG incidents analyzed 28 (41.79%) were recorded as having fair responses.

**Positive Responses**
This is scored by noting those reports that attracted
- Evidence of some definite actions by the government in response to the report of the incidence

- Acknowledgement of the action taken by the government to address the issue/incidence reported

The result shows that of the cases of SSRG incidents analyzed 29 (43.28%) were recorded as having positive responses.

## 4.3. How do actors reinforce, change or weaken the context?

Two possible ways of assessing how the actors reinforce, change or weaken the context can clearly be made by examining the nature of inter – agency and the level/quality of civil – military relations in the country. On both issues, evidence from the analysis of the media tracking conducted in the course of this research show that there are challenges in relation to inter agency and civil military relations. Twenty (20) media stories were randomly chosen to examine the level of Inter-Agency and Civil-Military Relations published between 2004 and 2019. The findings revealed that the problems of inter-agency rivalry

Diagram 2: Civil-Military Relations and Inter-Agency Cooperation



- Inter-Agency Relations
- Civil-Military/Security

## Diagram 3: Inter-agency Cooperation



**Table 3:** Civil-Military Relations and Inter-Agency Cooperation

| Ratings | Reports | Per% | Relations | Reports | Per% | Inter-Agency | Reports | Per% |
|---------|---------|------|-----------|---------|------|--------------|---------|------|
| Negative | 16 | 80 | Inter-Agency Relations | 16 | 80 | Police-Army Clashes | 09 | 56.25 |
| Fair | 02 | 10 | Civil-Military/ Security | 04 | 20 | Police-NSCDC | 02 | 12.5 |
| Positive | 02 | 10 | | | | Police-Air Force | 01 | 6.25 |
| | | | | | | Police-Navy | 01 | 6.25 |
| | | | | | | Air Force-NDLEA | 01 | 6.25 |
| | | | | | | Inter-Agency Collaborations | 02 | 12.5 |
| **Total** | **20** | **100** | | **20** | **100** | | **16** | **100** |

———

**Key stats/information:**
1. About 20 stories chosen randomly were used to gauge the level of Inter-Agency rivalry and or collaboration as well as Civil-Military Relations/conflict
2. The oldest date of the stories was published in 2004 while the latest was this August 2019
3. What this showed is that the problem of inter-agency rivalry or civil-military/security conflict has been an entrenched and old one
4. Also there have been no deliberate and concrete efforts on the part of government to investigate and resolve the twin challenges of inter-agency as well as Civil-Military/security clashes
5. The findings also exposed the fact that all the agencies are involved in one form of rivalry and clashes or the other from time to time
6. Findings also revealed that Police, followed by the Army are involved in most of the Inter-Agency clashes
7. Few efforts made towards Inter-Agency collaboration and friendly Civil-Military Relations have been superficial

or civil - military /security conflicts are well entrenched and not a new occurrence. The analysis showed that 80% of the reports were negative while the rest were either fair or positive. It also revealed that the Police, followed by the Army are involved in most of the inter-agency clashes. The analysis also shows poor record of civil – military relationship in the country.

Two major campaigns clearly highlight the terrible state and lack of trust of citizens towards security agencies and the government. These are as follows:

- On the civil-military issues, the #EndSARS which was a campaign by some members of the public against the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) requesting for an end/scrapping of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad of the NPF.
- The second is the #RevolutionNow which was a campaign commenced early August 2019 by some citizens against the current government and calling for a revolution by the masses.

Inter-agency clashes and poor civil-military relations negatively affect and worsen the already prevailing security challenges in the country and region. These also create obstacles which hinder efforts at addressing the security challenges in the country and impede security sector reforms and governance in the country. Unfortunately, there few concrete efforts on the part of government to investigate and resolve the twin challenges of inter-agency as well as Civil-Military/security clashes. Some of these have focused on undertaking joint operations. Some training programmes aimed at promoting Inter-agency cooperation amongst security agencies as well as enhancing civil-military relationship have also being carried by some organizations.  Example KAS has over the years implemented series of training on these issues targeting senior and middle cadres as well as heads of security agencies and Civil Society leaders in the following States: Gombe,

Bauchi, Yobe, Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, Rivers, Delta, and Bayelsa States.

On the issue of assessing the level of antagonism against the work of civil society organizations, this can be examined through the lens of shrinking of the civil society spaces. There are several actions of the government that curtails the operations and activities of civil society organizations, for example, persistant information on controversial NGO bill and the news of the shut down of NGO offices by the army in the north east.

## 4.4. What opportunities and challenges can be created by the changes (in the context of future events)?

There is need to develop and effectively implement a comprehensive and sustainable approach that will enhance the cooperation, collaboration and coordination amongst security sector institutions and mechanisms as well as improve the relationship between the civil populace and security agencies. Some of the activities recommended to help facilitate these should focus on improving the knowledge, capacity and attitude of security agencies as well also creating increased opportunity and incentives aimed at encouraging partnership and collaboration between CSOs and security agencies. There is also need to ensure that effective coalitions and platforms are established based on good stakeholder analysis and understanding of the context to clearly identify the 'change agents', 'spoiler', and other key stakeholders and adopt appropriate approach in relating to each of these. Leadership training and support aimed at promoting security sector reform and governance need to invested in. These activities will positively influence the various actors as well as help address the security challenges in the country.

# V. Conclusion and Recommendations

## 5.1. Conclusion

The summary overview of the media tracking of reports on SSRG in Nigeria revealed that there is a need for targeted measures towards some of the regional peculiarities of the security challenges. It also confirmed the fact that Nigeria's security challenges are not only entrenched but national in scope. In addition, Civil-Military and Inter-Agency relations are not healthy enough to engender effective SSRG in Nigeria.

The findings also show that despite the efforts of some of the actors especially the CSOs, ECOWAS, AU and Nigerian government, there are still gaps as the needed synergy, inter-agency collaboration and harmonization as well as implementation of relevant laws and policies geared towards SSRG. In addition, there a need need for CSOs including the media to ensure promotion of security sector reform and good governance in Nigeria. The importance of this cannot be ignored especially at this critical period the country is facing serious security challenges as well as allegations of abuse and corruption by security agencies and personnel. Some interventions to address some of these challenges have been and are being undertaken by the Nigerian government, development partners and CSOs.  However, many of these are adhoc, unsustainable, piecemeal, and lack coordination and proper synergy with exiting and other interventions/mechanisms. Most are also driven by development partners/external actors to the government. Some glimmer of hope is offered by the dedicated efforts of the CSOs through their oversight and policy formulation mechanisms on security, governance and justice sector, unfortunately these have not been complimented enough by deliberate government actions to sustain or scale up these.

Furthermore, more resources need to be channeled effectively to address the specific security challenges faced by each of the various regions in the country. These must be accountable, involve the participation of the community, ensure the trust and acceptance of the communities, devoid of human rights violations for it to be successful.

## 5.2. Recommendations

The following recommendations are being made to make security services more accountable, responsive and equitable to the security needs of the population in Nigeria and the ECOWAS region:

(i).  **Institutionalization of the ECOWAS Peer Review Mechanisms:**
Institutionalization of the ECOWAS Peer Review Mechanism using the SSR Framework to assess compliance level and progress in relation to the implementation of the framework. This should include the provision of support to ECOWAS to accelerate the implementation of its SSRG Framework within one year. Peer Review mechanism on SSRG among member states of ECOWAS should be given strong support and institutionalized as a regular process. This may adopt a similar approach as is the case with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of countries by the UN Human Rights Council.

(ii). **Strengthening the Coordination and Cooperation between the ECOWAS, AU and Member States:**
To achieve sustainable results in prevention and resilience to insecurity, terrorism and violent extremism, the UN, AU, ECOWAS and Member States need to improve coher-

ence and coordination in their objectives, planning, programming, implementation mechanism and action. The principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage provide theoretical and practical frameworks for addressing coordination. Concrete steps should be taken to ensure that these principles are properly understood, agreed on by all stakeholders and applied. At the ECOWAS level, the operation of the additional principle of supra-nationality which implies that decisions taken by ECOWAS statutory bodies are directly applicable to Member States without further need for ratification is an advantage that can be best put into use by the AU and the UN where applicable.

**(iii). Enhancing CSOs engagement of SSRG in Nigeria and the ECOWAS region:**

There is need to strengthen the synergy and collaboration between CSOs and ECOWAS and AU on SSRG. There is need to enhance the knowledge and engagement of CSOs towards promoting public awareness and implementation on the AU SSR Framework as well as encourage the monitoring and tracking of the implementation of the framework. These activities may adopt measures similar to those adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) which include granting of observer status to NGOs working on the issues and National Human Rights Institutions and requesting regular submissions and other reports from these, invitation for participation at the Ordinary Sessions of the Commission held every six months with delegations from AU member countries in attendance, organization of NGO Forum preceding the Ordinary Sessions of the Commission with resolutions and recommendations from the NGO Forum submitted to the Commission during the public sessions at each of its Ordinary Session, etc. These

activities help in increasing the visibility of the work of the Commission and encourage increased participation and collaboration of NGOs and NHRIs in the work of the Commission. For example, at every commission session we have between 150 to 350 NGOs participating. The AU, ECOWAS and member state government should as a matter of urgency involve and engage the CSOs in a proactive manner towards promoting SSRG in the region and in the respective countries. ECOWAS should also adopt a similar forum as the AU/SSR Forum.

Capacity building for the media to improve the quality and frequency of media reportage on SSRG related issues should be undertaken. Also, at the national level there is need to make issues of SSRG part of advocacy for political office holders. CSOs should track the performance of political office holders regarding this. Part of the activities to be undertaken by CSOs should involve advocating for the effective implementation of laws and policies relating to SSRG and monitoring/ tracking the progress on these.

**(iv). Increased Buy - In and Sense of Ownership at Community, National and Regional Level:**

Support should be based on clear understanding of the actual security needs at the individual, sub national and national levels. All support should be based on local demands. Patience and willingness to take risks will be needed. Stakeholders consultation is encouraged not only prior to the initiation of SSRG programmes but throughout the course of the programme. This should also have clear strategy to encourage increased buy – in and sense of ownership as well as sustainability of the programme beyond the period when external support is available. This should also be based on a clear understanding that a security sector that is accountable to civilian authorities and ordi-

nary people is best structured to meet security threats of individuals, their communities and country and that this will be more affordable for the community and nation. Attempt should also be made to promote not only the security of the country but also the security of the ECOWAS region.

**(v). Influencing the Training Content and Approach of Security Sector Agencies:**
This should involve incorporation of relevant training modules to encourage inter-agency cooperation, strategies for improving civil-military relationships, human rights, strategies for promoting security sector reforms and good governance, etc. These should also include the institutionalization of joint training programmes at the training institutions of all security agencies, targeted security training institutions and at State and zonal command levels.

**(vi). Promoting Partnership and Collaboration Between Civil Society Organizations and Security Agencies:**
This should include programmes that encourage coordination of actions as well as joint programmes such as technical reviews; development of legislative framework and policies; monitoring / oversight of policies and programmes; and exchange of information aimed at improving security, promoting security sector reforms and good governance; etc.

**(vii). Encourage Increased Positive Social Engagement Amongst Security Agencies and Between Security Agencies and the Civilian Population:**
These may include activities which provides opportunity for assistance to the civilian population by security agencies both in situation of conflicts and other circumstances of need. For example, if a community do not have potable water, a scheme may be developed by any or some of the security agencies located in or close to the community to assist the community to address this problem. Same applies to health care or other humanitarian services. The security agencies may involve other relevant government agencies and others that are best positioned to provide such service while they security agency/ies may play only a facilitatory role or/and provide security support for the intervention. This is may also include security agencies carrying out security awareness and sensitization programmes at schools and community level.

Other activities may include joint sporting programmes, and other social events Some of these may be exclusives for only the various security agencies, while some may involve their families, and some may involve CSOs leaders and staff, and some may involve the entire community.

**(viii). Effective implementation of the National Security Strategy (2019) launched by the government of Nigeria in December 2019:**
There is the need to ensure that all key stakeholders are sensitized on the content of the National Security Strategy and that this document is made to be fully operational with clear mechanisms to encourage the synergy and alignment of the policies, budgets and programmes of all security agencies, and relevant government ministries, departments and agencies guided by the content of the NSS starting with the next 5 years covered by the NSS.

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## ANNEXES

### Diagram 4: Geopolitical Spread of Reports on Security Threats/Violence/ Conflicts & Incidence in Nigeria

- 25% South West
- 24% North East
- 15% North West
- 13% National/Abuja-FCT
- 8% South East
- 8% South-South
- 7% North Central

**Key stats/information:**

1. This is a three-week tracking of relevant reports from the major print and online media in Nigeria on security issues in the country (August 01-23,2019)
2. There are total 67 reports from different print and online in Nigeria
3. South West, North East, North West and National/ Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, dominated geographical location of reported events
4. South-East, North-Central and South-South had the least reported SSRG incidents
5. Rivers (South-South), Lagos (South-West), Borno (North-East) and Katsina (North-West) States dominated their respective regions with about 80%, 59%, 38% and 30% of reports respectively

## Diagram 5: Nature & Types of Violence and Conflicts Reported



**Key stats/information:**
1. *About 88 SSRG related issues were highlighted in the 67 relevant reports from the major print and online media in Nigeria on security issues in the country within the period under review.
2. This gave a picture of the prevailing and trending security atmosphere in Nigeria
3. The stats showed that crimes and related threats dominated with about 49% of the trending SSRG reports, followed by insurgency and terrorism, and farmers-herders conflict
4. The criminal incidents were dominated by murder/homicide (40%), robbery (21%) and kidnapping (16%)

## REGIONAL TRENDS

### Diagram 6: South East Region



- Crime
- Farmers-Herders Conflict
- Governance/Socio-Political Crisis
- Civil-Military/Security and Inter-Agency Relations

## Diagram 7: Federal Capital Territory

- Crime — 50%
- Governance Crises/Rights Violations — 25%
- Civil-Military/Security and Inter-Agency Relations — 9%
- Farmers-Herders Conflict — 8%
- Ethnic/Communal Clashes — 8%

## Diagram 8: North Central Geo-Political Zone

- Crime — 55%
- Civil-Military/Security and Inter-Agency Relations — 18%
- Governance Crisis/Rights Violations — 18%
- Farmers-Herders Conflict — 9%

## Diagram 9: South-South Geo-Political Zone

| Category | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Crime | ~60 |
| Communal Unrest/Clashes | ~20 |
| Rights Violations | ~12 |
| Civil-Military/Security | ~12 |

## Diagram 10: North West Region



Bar chart values:
- Banditry/Farmers-Herders: 62,5
- Crime: 25
- Governance/Rights Violations: 6,25
- Civil-Military/Security: 6,25

## Diagram 11: North East Geo-Political Zone



- Insurgency/Terrorism — 46%
- Crime — 27%
- Humanitarian Crises/Efforts — 15%
- Farmers-Herders Conflict — 4%
- Ethnic/Communal Clashes — 4%
- Civil-Military/Security and Inter-Agency Relations — 4%

## Diagram 12: South West Region



## Diagram 13: Response in Chart

## ABOUT THE PUBLICATION

This study on Nigeria is part of the regional baseline study that was conducted by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) team for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Competence Centre (FES PSCC) as part of the project "Security for All" (co-financed by the European Union). This baseline study intends to be a gap analysis audit and an overview on SSG/R processes in targeted countries (Mali, Nigeria and Cameroun) and the wider ECOWAS region. This study examines the current situation regarding security sector governance and the inclusion of civil society in formulating security policies as well as the oversight of the security sector, taking into consideration initiatives undertaken by ECOWAS, the African Union, as well as national initiatives in the three project countries.

The aim is to identify gaps and the causes of the weak involvement of civil society in the public oversight of the security sector so that project activities in all work packages can be specifically tailored and targeted to encourage greater participation of CSOs in these reform processes in West and Central Africa. The study also provides additional baseline data by showing shortcomings and root-causes in order to make security provision more accountable, responsive and equitable for the security needs of populations.

**FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG**